In recent weeks, Nepal has plunged into turmoil as violent Gen Z–led protests swept across the country, leaving 72 people dead and over 2,000 injured. Government offices, police posts, and public property were set ablaze, while security forces resorted to force in an attempt to quell the unrest. At the center of the uprising are young citizens, but what raises deeper concern is the questionable role of foreign-funded NGOs, accused of channeling resources and narratives that have amplified the anger on the streets. This is no longer just an internal matter of governance; it is a symptom of how external influences can destabilize fragile democracies. For India, bound to Nepal by geography, history, and security interests, these upheavals are far from distant. They carry the seeds of challenges that could spill across borders and reshape the regional balance in ways that demand close attention.

In September 2025, Nepal’s government suddenly banned 26 social media platforms—including Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, YouTube, X, and even LinkedIn—on grounds that they had not registered locally or complied with Nepali law. For young people, the move felt like an assault on their only space to challenge leaders, expose corruption, and voice frustration over unemployment. On September 8th, thousands of students marched to parliament in Kathmandu chanting “Stop corruption, not social media,” but security forces cracked down with water cannons, tear gas, and bullets, leaving at least 19 dead and hundreds injured. The protests, quickly dubbed Nepal’s “Gen Z Revolution,” targeted a political order dominated for decades by figures like K.P. Sharma Oli, Pushpa Kamal Dahal “Prachanda,” and Sher Bahadur Deuba.

Amid the growing unrest, the public attention soon turned to the NGO ‘Hami Nepal’, led by Sudhan Gurung, which helped mobilize youths to voice their discontent against the government. What initially appears to be an independent protest, however, carries deeper undercurrents. The organization has financial ties with several controversial figures, raising questions about hidden agendas. For instance, the Chairman of Infinity Holdings—a key funder—has faced allegations of corrupt involvement in small-arms procurement deal with the Nepal Government. Reports suggest that weapons were purchased at inflated prices, fueling concerns of profiteering from state contracts. The juxtaposition of business figures implicated in questionable practices alongside globally lauded reformers raises an analytical question: to what degree is the recent wave of “Gen Z” activism in Nepal an internally generated movement, and to what extent might its visibility and momentum be conditioned or amplified by external actors and networks of influence?

Suspicion about NGOs in times of upheaval arises because they provide tools that make protest movements stronger and more organized. First, they create narrative support by funding media training, independent journalism, and election monitoring, which helps opposition groups quickly raise questions of fairness—as happened in Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution when foreign-funded exit polls supported claims of fraud. Second, they spread protest tactics across countries: for example, Serbian activists trained Georgians before the 2003 Rose Revolution, teaching methods like humor, non-violent disruption, and catchy symbols. Third, they provide resources—small grants for transport, communication, and legal aid—which help turn public anger into a sustained movement. Lastly, they build legitimacy by giving activists international recognition through awards, fellowships, and media platforms, which both amplifies their voice and protects them from being dismissed as troublemakers. While this does not prove that NGOs control these movements, it shows how they create a support system that makes protests grow faster and stronger.

International events like Serbia’s “Bulldozer Revolution” in 2000 became the prototype of modern NGO-linked uprisings, with the student movement Otpor! —funded and supported by groups such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the Open Society Institute—using humor, nonviolence, and street theatre to oust Milošević and later export its methods abroad. This script repeated in Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution, where Kmara! activists, trained by Serbian veterans and supported by Western foundations, mobilized crowds that toppled Shevardnadze. Ukraine followed in 2004 with the Orange Revolution, heavily backed by international NGOs like Freedom House and the National Democratic Institute, which funded unprecedented election monitoring operations, and again in 2014 with Euromaidan, where civil-society groups provided logistical and media infrastructure to sustain protests against corruption and for EU integration. The Arab Spring of 2011 amplified this model: in Tunisia and Egypt, youth activists trained in nonviolent resistance and empowered by NGO-supported blogger and legal networks harnessed social media to accelerate protests, though outcomes diverged from democratic transition to authoritarian relapse or violent collapse. The same echoes appeared in South Asia—Sri Lanka’s 2022 mass protests against economic crisis were propelled by youth networks shaped by governance-focused NGOs, while in 2024 Bangladesh’s student-led movement, boosted by international amplification, ousted Sheikh Hasina and installed Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus as interim leader. Across these cases, grievances were locally rooted, but NGO scaffolding, transnational training, and foreign funding consistently structured and amplified uprisings, while also blurring the line between support for democracy and geopolitical intervention

The larger global record further underscores the controversy: in 2021 the Mexican government formally accused NED of interventionism after it funded anti-government organizations, calling it an attempt to promote a coup. Since 2017 NED has allegedly supported at least 54 anti-Cuba groups. USAID has also faced criticism. Although it has now shut down its offices, it left behind a controversial legacy—most notably a $50 million “jihad literacy” program in the 1980s. This initiative produced and spread ultra-conservative textbooks in Afghanistan, texts that glorified violence as religious duty and later circulated widely in Pakistan.

Foreign-funded NGOs are often seen as tools through which Western countries subtly assert their dominance, representing a new form of neo-colonialism. Instead of direct political control, influence today is exercised through financial aid, advocacy campaigns, and civil society interventions that align local narratives with Western agendas. By funding NGOs that challenge government policies on trade, energy, environment, or human rights, these countries gain leverage over developing nations, steering them toward regulatory frameworks and social discourses that favor Western economic and strategic interests.

Seen against the backdrop of these global uprisings, Nepal’s Gen Z unrest cannot be viewed as a stand-alone outburst but rather as part of a recurring international template. The immediate trigger—the social media ban—was local, as were the frustrations over corruption, unemployment, and stagnant leadership. Yet, the transformation of discontent into a disciplined mass movement was shaped by external factors: an active NGO ecosystem, patrons with opaque funding sources, and transnational recognition platforms that amplified the movement’s visibility. This interplay reveals that while the courage and grievances of Nepalese youth are genuine, the trajectory of the protests has not been entirely self-directed.

Seen in the wider South Asian context, Nepal’s current unrest should worry India not because the grievances of Nepalese youth lack legitimacy, but because instability in a close neighbor with whom we share deep cultural, religious, and open-border ties inevitably impacts India’s security and regional environment. Past crises in Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Pakistan have shown how unrest in the neighborhood forces India to divert attention and resources away from long-term global ambitions toward immediate crisis management. Moreover, such upheavals, though locally rooted, are often amplified by international networks seeking to slow India’s rise by keeping the region unstable. For India, the challenge is twofold: to extend timely reassurance and support to neighbors like Nepal, while also strengthening its own resilience against spillover effects.

While Nepal’s current turmoil appears to be a Gen Z–driven uprising, the deeper reality reveals layers of manipulation where Gen Y networks, seasoned activists, and foreign-funded NGOs are amplifying youthful discontent into a sustained political movement. What begins as genuine frustration over corruption, unemployment, or restrictions like the social media ban is quickly structured, financed, and internationalized by actors whose agendas stretch far beyond the grievances of Nepalese youth. This manipulation transforms scattered protests into disciplined campaigns, lending them symbols, strategies, and global visibility that local anger alone could not generate. The tragedy is that authentic voices of a generation seeking change risk being subsumed into a larger script of external influence and geopolitical maneuvering, leaving Nepal more polarized, unstable, and vulnerable to forces that thrive on perpetual unrest.